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ABSTRACT 
Manifest Complexity:  A Foundational Ethic for Astrobiology? 
 
This paper examines the age old question of the basis of moral value in a the new 
context of astrobiology, which offers a fresh perspective.  The goal is to offer the broad 
outline of a general theory of moral value that can accommodate the diversity of living 
entities we are likely to encounter beyond the confines of Earth.  It begins with 
ratiocentrism, the view that the possession of reason is the primary means by which we 
differentiate entities having moral value in and of themselves from those having moral 
value merely by virtue of the uses to which they can be put.  I extend this basic position 
by arguing that reason, sociality and culture tend to arise in evolution as a co-
evolutionary “package deal.”  Because of this, it’s really the sociality-reason-culture triad 
(SRCT) which should be the criterion for intrinsic moral value, not reason alone. 
Interestingly, if the SRCT linkage is sufficiently strong, it follows that this sort of moral 
valuation would be shared by any non-human entities capable of reflection on the nature 
of such things, granting it a curious kind of objectivity.  Then I suggest that the unfolding 
of complexity produced by SRCT species may be the best means to realize the manifest 
destiny (or manifest complexity) of all life, which may provide an ultimate, metaphysical 
foundation for ethical value.   Finally, I outline how this new theory can be applied to 
different types of entities that we may encounter beyond Earth.  
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1. Overview 
One of the truly fundamental questions in moral philosophy is this:  on what basis 
do entities acquire moral value?  Without a clear answer to this question, it becomes 
difficult to adjudicate whenever the interests of different entities conflict.   This question 
has been the subject of philosophical discussion on Earth for thousands of years, but 
thinking about ethics through the lens of astrobiology can impact the debate in interesting 
new ways.  First, when only considering the terrestrial context, there is a tendency to treat 
the small sample of the terrestrial life as representative of what is possible. Thus, because 
humans are unique in possessing sophisticated rational capacity on Earth, even careful 
thinkers can come to view their special moral status as being due to their humanity rather 
than their reason.  Second, when we are talking about life beyond Earth, there is no direct 
self interest as there always is with terrestrial situations, since we all share the same 
ecosystem.  This makes it difficult to fully disentangle different types of justifications – 
are we preserving ecological diversity because these non-human entities have intrinsic 
moral worth or because failing to do so harms human beings indirectly?   
In this paper, I wish to suggest a very broad outline of a system of ethical value 
which can account for the vastly expanded set of possibilities astrobiology opens up.  The 
issues are extremely complex, but the basic structure of my argument is relatively simple.  
It begins with ratiocentrism, the view that the possession of reason is the primary means 
by which we differentiate entities having moral value in and of themselves from those 
having moral value merely by virtue of the uses to which they can be put.  I extend this 
basic position by arguing that reason, sociality and culture tend to arise in evolution as a 
co-evolutionary “package deal.”  Because of this, it’s really the sociality-reason-culture 
triad (SRCT) which should be the criterion for intrinsic moral value, not reason alone. 
Interestingly, if the SRCT linkage is sufficiently strong, it follows that this sort of moral 
valuation would be shared by any non-human entities capable of reflection on the nature 
of such things, granting it a curious kind of objectivity.  Then I suggest that the unfolding 
of complexity produced by SRCT species may be the best means to realize the manifest 
destiny (or manifest complexity) of all life, which may provide an ultimate, metaphysical 
foundation for ethical value.   Finally, I outline how this new theory can be applied to 
different types of entities that we may encounter beyond Earth.  
 Before we begin, however, we have to deal with a common confusion between 
descriptions of how we do, in fact, act towards each other and how we should act.  Ethics 
is about proscribing actions, not merely describing them and failure to appreciate the 
difference will lead to a number of pseudo-objections to any ethical theory.  For example, 
one might object to ratiocentrism on the grounds that it does not accurately capture how 
we have historically treated other rational creatures (e.g., slaves, American Indians, etc.).  
But the fact that people have often mistreated other rational creatures does not imply that 
they should do so.  It’s the very fact of our many misdeeds that motivates the 
 
development of ethics in the first place.  Moreover, we are forced to use ethical ideals to 
identify and correct such moral lapses: how else could we explain to a slaver why what he 
is doing is morally wrong, other than to appeal to ideals that he does not currently accept?  
 
2. Ratiocentrism Simpliciter  
Let me begin with a brief discussion of the ratiocentric position I have developed 
for astrobiological contexts elsewhere[1][2], though my goal in this is paper is not to 
engage in the daunting project of arguing for ratiocentrism directly, but rather to examine 
the implications of such a foundation for astrobiological ethics.  There is a very long 
tradition in ethics, going back at least as far as the ancient Greeks, where reason is seen 
as the sine qua non of moral value.  More precisely, reason is said to afford an entity 
moral value in and of itself (intrinsically) as opposed to in virtue of the uses to which it 
can be put (instrumentally).  The basic idea is simple:  ethics involves the elucidation of 
rules and this in turn requires formal abstraction of the sort that is only possible through 
reason.  It is thus literally not possible to think about ethics, as ethics, unless one is able 
to engage in abstract reasoning – at a minimum, one must be able to formulate and 
comprehend the nature of rules.  This does not, as is commonly misperceived, mean that 
entities without sufficient reason have no significant moral value.  But it’s certainly a 
classic philosophical position that their moral value is of a lessor kind than that of 
rational beings is different[3].   
 So I begin with ratiocentrism.  But in one of my first public presentations on the 
subject, when I was part of a NASA workgroup investigating the philosophical, ethical 
and theological implications of astrobiology[4], I was asked a question by a rabbi which I 
have been thinking about ever since.  The question was simple: “Why reason instead of 
love?”  At the time, I responded by saying that love of the requisite sort to qualify for 
intrinsic moral valuation would have to incorporate a goodly measure of reason.  That is, 
the simple feeling of love would not be enough, since one would have to act in specific 
ways to communicate and express this feeling, which in turn would require a 
sophisticated understanding of social relationships, which would require reason.  So love 
is not a truly independent measure of moral value, but is relevant to moral considerations 
only when expressed by a sufficiently rational being.  I still feel this response is 
essentially correct, but I also think the question demands a more careful exploration of 
the relationship between reason, emotion and sociality and this is one of the motivations 
of the present work. 
 
3. On Sociality and Social Emotions 
 I adopt a thoroughly evolutionary perspective on ethics.  Whatever ethical rules 
we adopt, they are inexorably influenced by the ways in which our brains have evolved.  
This may seem strange, given what I have already said about the need for ethics to be 
more than descriptive facts.  However, the requirement that ethics be grounded in 
evolution need not mean that there is nothing more to ethical rules than historical 
contingency.   There is a strong tendency to think of evolution as a random process, and it 
is in one sense. However, the random nature of mutation does not imply that the results of 
natural selection, either in a particular case or across an entire system, are random.  For 
example, it may be that fish share the same basic body shape not simply because of 
accident and shared ancestry, but in virtue of the optimality of this design for movement 
 
in a fluid medium.  The more frequently particular patterns emerge in independent 
evolutionary processes, the more confident we can be that they express underlying 
principles that transcend the specific circumstances in which they evolved.  And this sort 
of phenomena can apply to behaviors as wells as body plans: there has been a lot of work 
on the identification of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS’s), which are group strategies 
that can successfully resist invasion by alternative strategies[5].  Any particular ESS exists 
in part because of a complex mix of contingent historical factors, but also in part because 
of more fundamental, potentially even universal considerations – for example, game 
theory imposes universal constraints on any entity which must interact with others.  
Given this mindset, what can be learned from the relationship between socially 
advantageous emotions, sociality, and reason that will inform our discussion of ethical 
valuation? 
 There are a few key aspects of the relationship between sociality, reason and 
culture that are relevant at present.  In particular, the central question is the extent to 
which these traits can evolve independently of each other.  I offer the tentative conclusion 
that they are essentially a “package deal” and coin the term Social-Rational-Cultural 
Triad (SRCT) to describe this union of complex potentialities. Below I examine each 
level of the relationship, giving both empirical and theoretical arguments for this 
conclusion. 
 It is clearly possible to have sociality in general without reason or culture, since 
we have social insects on Earth that possess the one but not the others.  However, the 
type of sociality that social insects embody and the type I wish to discuss are very 
different.  Social insects are social towards their close relatives in a way achieved by 
neural hardwiring.  But this sort of sociality restricts the group to a relatively small set of 
stereotypical interactions of the sort that is not conducive to the development of truly 
complex social systems and their attendant culture.  Thus, it seems hard to imagine social 
insects, whose sociality is dependent on genetic relatedness, being able to entertain moral 
obligations to another species.  If, on the other hand, the organisms possess sufficient 
reason to recognize conspecifics and form theories of their desires and goals based on 
their behavior, then they can adopt a potentially infinite set of behaviors in response to 
shifting conditions on very short time scales, including the development of ethical 
principles governing social interactions.  It is only this kind of adaptive sociality that I 
have in mind when I talk about a link between sociality and reason. 
Based on the limited sample of organisms we have on Earth, it may be that one 
can not have reason without adaptive sociality.   Consider a few empirical findings from 
terrestrial evolution: 
1. There is a long appreciated (roughly) linear relationship between brain:body 
ratio (considered the best measure for interspecific comparisons of rational 
ability) and adaptive sociality[6]. 
2. Animals which are best at problem solving (e.g., primates, corvids) tend to 
also live in social groups[7]. 
3. There are often temporal associations in evolutionary history that suggest a 
strong causal connection between adaptive sociality and reason – as with the 
observation that dophins’ brain:body ratio increased dramatically at about the 
same time they became social[8][9].  
 
4. Terrestrial creatures we know of that possess reason but not adaptive sociality 
may well be organisms in evolutionary transition.  For example, recent work 
in octopuses, who are highly intelligent but haven’t been classified previously 
as social, suggests that they possess the ability to recognize conspecifics and 
perhaps even form dominance hierarchies[10].     
And “prosocial” instincts which set the stage for ethical thinking are probably part 
of the mix as well.   In recent years, prosocial capacities have been discovered in a wide 
range of non-humans animals[11] and it is often difficult to describe these without 
resorting to ethical terms.  For example, non-human primates seem to have a rudimentary 
sense of “fairness,” and react to “unfair” situations in much the same way we see in 
humans.  This capacity doesn’t (probably) rise to the level of rational principles in such 
organisms, but manifests rather as a set of emotional responses which serve to bias 
behavior in socially desirable ways.  The same could be said of other emotional responses 
that often factor strongly in human ethical reasoning – romantic love, for example, is 
presumably a sophisticated adaptation for the promotions of pair bonding.  This 
emotional substratum underlies the development of conceptual ethical systems once 
sufficient abstract ability is available. 
Of course, a major recurrent problem in astrobiology is trying to discern what 
patterns we see in terrestrial life represent general trends that would apply on other 
planets.  It is certainly possible that the sociality-reason association reflects something 
more prosaic than a universal law.  But there is also a good theoretical case to be made 
for a strong association between adaptive sociality and reason.  Consider that any non-
social organism with the capacity to reason would be at an enormous disadvantage 
relative to other rational creatures who are both rational and social, since that 
combination allows them to coordinate the activities of multiple individuals to a single 
end.  Similarly, a social group without reason would be at a severe disadvantage to 
another group with such capacity.  Given this, what should we expect to see beyond the 
confines of Earth?   First, it seems reasonable to suppose that we will rarely see adaptive 
sociality without reason.  Second, since adaptive sociality and reason actively co-evolve, 
with flexible social systems providing fertile new ground for the exercise of reason and 
reason enriching the complexity of social interactions, it seems likely that we would not 
see the highest expressions of either in isolation.   
What about culture?  At its most basic, culture is a set of learned group behaviors.  
As with prosocial emotions, recent research has shown that culture is far more 
widespread than we had previously thought[12][13][14].  With culture, the connection to 
adaptive sociality and reason is more obvious. Culture requires learning from others, so 
anything more than extremely rudimentary culture will require rationality as well as 
social organization. Moreover, any group with the cultural capacity to preserve 
serendipitous discoveries through learning will be at a massive advantage over other, 
non-cultural, groups and thus there will be powerful selective pressure for the 
development to culture to quickly follow the social-rational pairing.  And certainly 
anything approaching science could not possibly occur absent a highly developed 
capacity for abstract thought and a sophisticated social structure to coordinate the 
activities of individuals, transmit historical information, etc.    
It seems reasonable to suppose that adaptive sociality, reason and culture are 
evolutionarily linked such that they arise and coevolve as a unit.  Encountering an 
 
organism beyond Earth with one leg of the SRCT but not the others (in similar measure) 
will thus be, at the very least, rare.  If the development of SRCT is at all common, it will 
be rarer still that such an organism becomes the dominant species on a planet,.  Again, 
the argument is not that it is not possible to have partial realization of SRCT, but that this 
is situation is likely a short lived transitional state and thus will be a small portion of any 
sample of extraterrestrial life we survey.  
 
4. Injecting Normativity 
 The case I have laid out so far is entirely descriptive, albeit with theoretical 
elements: there is, as a matter of fact, a strong tendency for adaptive sociality, reason, and 
culture to co-evolve.  Many philosophers would object that no amount of descriptive 
information about the way the world functions could, in principle, provide normative 
insight into how things should be. Despite my evolutionary orientation, I feel the pull of 
this objection and thus I want to offer reformulations of two classical arguments which 
may provide something approaching a normative foundation. 
 The first argument was originally developed by Immanuel Kant[15].  Kant was 
concerned with the problem of truth in a world where human beings can not directly 
access mind-independent reality.  If all we have for information is mind-mediated 
interactions with the “real world” through sensation, then on what grounds can we claim 
that the products of human reason (mathematics, science, etc.) are objectively true?  
However much we resist the conclusion, the inescapable fact is that we could never have 
good evidence that the products of human reason are truly isomorphic to external reality.  
Our ethical musings in section 3 face a similar dilemma: the mere fact that the universe 
seems to us to exhibit these evolutionary patterns does not imply that this is how things 
should be.  If there is a mind-independent ethical truth out there, we have no way of 
knowing how close the world we experience is to this.   
The temptation at this point is to shrug and say, “We can’t know ethical truth, so 
ethical views are ultimately no more than personal opinions.”  However, if we go far 
down that road, there is no meaningful distinction between how people wish to act and 
how they should act, in which case there is no such thing as ethics16.  But Kant argued 
that, despite our grim epistemic circumstances, there is still a sense in which the products 
of reason can be said to be said to be epistemically privileged.  Kant employed a unique 
transcendental argument that works something like this: Suppose we could identify 
principles that all rational creatures, whatever their circumstance, must accept1.  These 
would be principles essential to the operation of reason itself and would thus apply to any 
possessor of reason – human, alien or divine.  Of course, the existence of such universally 
accepted principles does not establish their truth in the intuitive sense of the word, since 
our reason could still be systematically flawed.  However, there is a curious sense in 
which the very universality of their acceptance confers objectivity.  Put crudely, I may 
not know that mathematics reflects the universe accurately, but I do know that any 
rational creature like myself will, of necessity, believe that it does.  This is as close to 
objectivity, and thus truth, as we can ever get. 
1 A more technical formulation would be “insofar as we know anything about the external world from our sensations, we necessarily presuppose certain propositions.”   
 
                                                        
 If I am right about the evolutionary confluence of reason, adaptive sociality and 
culture, we can make a similar argument about ethical truth.  While we can never know 
whether there is such a thing as objective ethical truth or how closely our views conform 
to it, we can know this:  Any SRCT creature in the universe, which is to say any creature 
that has ethics, will share our basic outlook.  They will all have evolved from non-SRCT 
organisms and have both self interested and social instincts in place.  Their rational 
capacity will allow them to formulate general ethical principles.  And those principles 
will recognize the value of entities with SRCT capacities like themselves as having 
intrinsic ethical value.  Like us, such creatures will feel the pull of social instincts that 
force them to consider the potential moral value of non-SRCT creatures, even of non-
living objects.  But also like us, when push comes to shove, they will believe that the 
interests of SRCT creatures like themselves must take precedence.   
Is this ethical truth?  Who can say, since we can not, in principle, acquire 
compelling evidence that these views match an external, mind-independent ethical 
reality?   But this makes the intuitive notion of truth an impossible standard.  Of course, 
the conclusion that there can be no truly objective truth in ethics is certainly nothing new 
even in the astrobiological context[17].   But what the transcendental argument allows us 
to do is, in effect, to have our ethical cake and eat it too.  It allows us to admit that we 
have no compelling evidence of an objective ethical truth in general, much less that any 
particular ethical belief accords with it.  But we can still say that an SRCT ethic will be 
universal in all creatures who can comprehend moral reasoning at all. 
 
5. Manifest Complexity 
 So far, I have attempted to argue  1) that adaptive sociality, reason, and culture 
are, in fact, an evolutionary “package deal” and consequently that  2) any SRCT species 
with ethical beliefs will view the possession of SRCT capacities as the ultimate basis of 
moral value. Now I must take a dip in metaphysical waters to suggest another reason to 
think that SRCT should be valued ethically.  To this end, I will take another classical 
philosophical argument, this time from Aristotle, and rework it for an astrobiological 
context. 
 Aristotle believed that, to find what the right thing for an entity to do, one first 
had to identify its unique purpose or goal (telos in Greek).  All types of entities had a 
telos, so humans, plants, fire, etc. all had their own essential goals.  Non-human entities 
simply acted in accord with their telos, of course, but humans possessed reason and thus 
were given the blessing/curse of reflection on the proper goal to pursue.  But even for 
humans, if the proper telos could be identified, then their moral course of action becomes 
clear, since he held that it is morally requisite for entities to act in such a way as to 
actualize their telos.  Unfortunately, humans do, in fact, pursue such a bewildering 
variety of goals that the task of identifying a single telos from among them doesn’t seem 
possible.   
 But consider the set of all human actions and ask yourself, “What is the shared 
purpose of these acts?”  Certainly, there is a huge diversity of goals in the most obvious 
sense:  Sally goes to work to make money, while Bill attends dance class for the sheer joy 
of movement, etc.  But is there any sense in which all of these immediate goals are 
actually directed towards a larger, overarching one?  If so, then all humans actions, 
whether we consciously appreciate the fact or not, would be directed toward a single 
 
goal.  Aristotle argued that, if we think about it carefully, we see that all human actions 
are ultimately directed towards the single, universal telos of happiness (eudaimonia).   
Happiness is clearly logically superior to these other goals because, while it makes sense 
to pursue one of the lesser goals because you think it will make you happy, it makes no 
sense to pursue happiness because you think it will result in money or pleasure.  Ipso 
facto, happiness is the end of all human action – all other goals are pursued, not for their 
own sake, but in pursuit of happiness.  
 Now let’s do this same type of thought experiment with the expanded notion of 
life astrobiology affords.  Different living entities act for all sorts of ends, but is there 
something which could potentially count as an overarching, ultimate goal? One obvious 
basic property of all life on Earth is that it is gloriously, ostentatiously negentropic.  Life 
seems to be characterized by increasing complexity and decreasing entropy, which goes 
against the overall thermodynamic tendency of the universe in which it finds itself, 
though there is some debate on this point[18][19].  There certainly are many known cases 
where the lineage of a particular organism is characterized by decreasing complexity 
(e.g., when an organism becomes parasitic).  But consider:  thermodynamics is a 
universal tendency with local exceptions.  It is not refuted (as creationists claim) by local 
examples of negentropy such as living beings. Similarly, the observation that life is 
characterized by increasing complexity is meant as a statement of a global trend, not an 
inviolate rule, and thus is not refuted by isolated counterexamples.  Evolution clearly 
produces more and more complex organisms over time, though it does not do so 
uniformly within each lineage at each transition.  And there seems no good reason to 
suppose that this pattern is peculiar to life on Earth as it’s hard to imagine anything alive 
that is not fundamentally negentropic.  So just as Aristotle argued that the overarching 
goal of all human action was happiness, it is quite possible that the overarching goal, or 
manifest destiny, of all life is the production of ever greater complexity.  This idea goes 
back hundreds of years to the principle of plenitude and medieval musings on the “great 
chain of being”[20] but has also been discussed by others in the astrobiological context[21].  
This manifest complexity is, of course, highly speculative.  But for the sake of 
argument, let’s assume for a moment that there is merit in the idea.  If the universe is 
biased towards the development of living complexity, is there a preferred means to that 
end?   Here, a look at the history of life on Earth in instructive as we see major 
discontinuities in the amount of diversity present which are often described as “major 
transitions” or even “phase changes”[22][23].  Essentially, evolution is marked by the 
periodic development of fundamentally new systems which allow for complexity many 
orders of magnitude greater than previously possible.   These are seen in the fossil record 
as sudden massive spikes in diversity.  For example, the “Cambrian explosion” is the 
sudden appearance, about 540 MYA, of essentially all the animal phyla that have ever 
existed.   This is thought to be the result of the development of multicellularity, which 
allowed much more complex forms of life.  There is some debate over precisely which 
developments make the list of major transitions, but certainly it would include the 
emergence of:  eukaryotic cells, multicellularity, sociality, and language/culture, because 
each of these makes possible massive increases in diversity (between parts within cells, 
between cells within an organism, between organisms within a population and between 
populations within a species, respectively).  Importantly, these developments are not just 
an historical sequence, they are a logical hierarchy and thus almost certainly would have 
 
analogs in evolution beyond Earth.  The degree of diversity possible with multicellular, 
social creatures is massively greater than that with non-social, single celled organisms, 
whether we are talking about Earth or Europa.   And the greatest degree of diversity is 
achieved when reason and adaptive sociality combine to produce the kind of 
sophisticated culture that gives rise to science, with all the new abilities that unlocks.    
 I freely grant that both of these arguments for injecting normativity into the 
assessment of moral value are controversial.  Philosophers will certainly find reasons to 
continue their debates about Kantian idealism and Aristotelian naturalism in a new venue 
and scientists will worry about the precise relationship between entropy and complexity.  
My goal at present is to suggest an intriguing possibility more than a developed theory.  It 
may be that the attempt ultimately fails, but for now I hope only that it inspires further 
work along these lines. 
 
6. Ratiocentrism Revisited 
 So, how can we translate this grand ethical theory into practical guidance for 
astrobiology?  As Darwin[24] once observed, in any taxonomic undertaking, there are two 
types of people.  There are “lumpers” who want to group examples together with an eye 
to revealing interesting principles, and there are “splitters” who want to emphasize the 
ways in which specific cases differ one from another.  Certainly, much can be gained by 
both strategies, but my interests at present are more aligned with the lumpers, since I 
wish to trace the broad outlines of a general theory.  Thus I beg the splitters’ indulgence 
when I say that there are three basic categories of living things in terms of their moral 
value. 
First, we have living beings with advanced SRCT capacities.  Humans certainly 
fall into this category, as do any aliens with scientific knowledge sufficiently advanced to 
contact us.  With tongue only slightly in cheek we can extend the oft-heard definition of 
intelligence from the SETI community as “the ability to build radio telescopes”[25] to 
moral contexts.  Such entities can do it all: they are capable of moral reflection by virtue 
of their reason and adaptive sociality and generate an entirely new kind of informational 
complexity through culture and, in particular, science.  As such, they possess intrinsic 
moral worth, meaning they are different in kind from entities which only have 
instrumental worth.   
This has two basic practical implications:   1) they should not be used in merely 
instrumental ways - ways that don’t serve their own ends, and  2) all such SRCT 
organisms should be treated equally (because they are, ethically speaking, equal)2. Of 
course, there can and will be endless questions posed about our specific obligations to 
other entities within this category in specific circumstances, just as ethicists on Earth 
constantly debate obligations among humans.  But any relationship between humans and 
other SRCT species should be governed by the same ethical considerations that apply to 
interactions between humans.  For example, it may be ethical to kill an SRCT alien, but 
only under circumstances where it would also be ethical to kill a human being.    
2 Critics often charge that ratiocentrism approaches reinforce anthropocentrism, but here 
it can be see that SRCT analysis in astrobiological contexts actually refutes it definitively.  
 
                                                        
Second are living beings with enough of the SRCT system in place that they can, 
at least potentially, participate in the societies of SRCT beings who have ethical 
principles.   Most of the “warm fuzzies” on Earth fall into this grey area to one degree or 
another.  On the one hand, they can participate in, even make significant contributions to, 
SRCT societies.  On the other hand, they lack the SRCT capacity to comprehend ethics or 
create an information dense culture. They have one foot in each camp and, because of 
this, their ethical value is of two different sorts.  These entities possess intrinsic moral 
value to the extent they can  participate in an SRCT society, but also can be treated 
instrumentally when needs must.  In other words, they have enough intrinsic value to be 
considered morally different in kind from other forms of non-SRCT life, but their 
intrinsic worth is of a lesser kind than true SRCT beings.   As a first approximation, 
SRCT beings should respect the interests of such beings as long as this does not conflict 
with their own essential interests.  Thus, while killing such a being for no purpose other 
than sport would be immoral, it might even be ethically obligatory to kill if, for example, 
science could be significantly advanced by doing so. 
One case which drives a lot of our intuition about this category are domesticated 
animals, particularly pets3.  They certainly provide instrumental value to human beings - 
originally by providing assistance with hunting and as a food source.  On the other hand, 
there is a real sense in which they are now truly members of human society.  They clearly 
possess significant SRCT capacity or it would not have been possible to domesticate 
them in the first place. And we interact with them as members of society - anyone who 
has owned a dog will understand that we can’t help but think about their internal mental 
states in much the same way we do with fellow humans.  These interactions even satisfy 
our instinctive desire for community since our hindbrain does not carefully differentiate 
between visiting with your dog and your neighbor.  Domesticated animals are, in a real 
sense, part of our social system and should be accorded moral value accordingly.  
However, should we find ourselves starving in a lifeboat with both human and non-
human occupants, it is not at all difficult to decide who we should eat to stay alive. 
Third, we have living creatures with no existing SRCT capacities. For example, 
microbes, plants and lower animals with only rudimentary neural systems. 
These entities have no intrinsic value at all and thus can be used as means to the ends of 
SRCT species, much as with non-living things.  However, there are two critical 
limitations to keep in mind.  First, the fact that SRCT species can use organisms with 
mere instrumental value as means to their ends does not mean that every SRCT 
individual or group can use them for any end they might wish to pursue.  For example, a 
corporation may wish to strip mine Mars at some point in the future, despite there being 
indigenous bacteria that would thus be endangered. Others might object that we should 
instead preserve the life for scientific study or even the aesthetic appreciation of eco-
tourists.  A complex debate needs to be had as to how to balance these interests, but note 
that this discussion should be within the confines of  a) the best use to be made of the life 
by  b) the SRCT species as a whole.   
3 The ethical status of such entities does not depend on the fact of a social interaction so 
much as the potential – so octopuses may have just as much potential to interact with 
SRCT beings as dogs do, even if they have never realized this potential.  If so, they 
should be afforded moral status accordingly.   
 
                                                        
Second, even though they do not possess SRCT traits at present, as living 
organisms, these entities are capable to the sort of the open-ended evolution that produces 
SRCT capacity.  Thus, they have the potential to become SRCT, given sufficient time and 
the proper circumstances, and this is a relevant consideration.   Thus, bacteria life on 
Mars may have the potential, in hundreds of millions of years, to develop into a race of 
sophisticated aliens with whom we could have engaging ethical discussions.  However, 
we should resist the idea that the mere potential to develop SRCT capacity confers full 
blown intrinsic moral value, as for example with Carl Sagan’s famous claim that “If there 
is life on Mars, I believe we should do nothing with Mars. Mars then belongs to the 
Martians, even if the Martians are only microbes” is misguided4.  There are two reason 
for this.  First, if one adopts a sufficiently long time frame, this potential is a universal 
property of all living creatures: the bacteria in my bathroom have every bit as much 
potential to develop into fascinating philosophical interlocutors as those on Mars.   
Second, whenever SRCT organisms can derive instrumental benefit from using such 
entities, we are morally required to consider the opportunity costs to humans of forgoing 
their use.  Foregoing a Martian colony in deference to indigenous life, for example, 
would impose a massive cost to human beings.  The ethical relevance of evolutionary 
potential, therefore, is limited: we should not trade the interests of existing SRCT beings 
with clear moral value for those of non-SRCT beings with only potential value.  
Nevertheless, it does make sense to consider such potential – for example, when 
weighing the interests of one such species against another.   
And of course on the bottom of the heap are non-living entities5.  Here there is no 
consideration at all other than pure utility to SRCT species.  The only restriction is that, 
as discussed above, it does not follow that any SRCT individual can do anything it wishes 
with non-living entities.  The interests of SRCT species as a whole should drive such 
decisions. 
There is a final, rather curious, implication of this theory: moral valuation is first 
and foremost a property of groups (most obviously, species) and is only extended to 
individuals indirectly.  Sociality and culture are, after all, properties of groups rather than 
individuals – an individual, whether human or alien, can only possess the capacity to be 
social or cultural and this is a matter of context.  We have two basic alternatives, 
therefore: a narrow view would accord moral value only to individuals who are 
positioned to actualize this potential in practice, while an expansive one would grant it to 
all individuals of the species, whatever their individual circumstances.  For example, 
what are we to do about a human being stranded on a desert island who will never again 
be part of a community or a particular member of an SRCT species with relatively 
4 It should be noted that Sagan’s next sentence is, “The existence of an independent 
biology on a nearby planet is a treasure beyond assessing, and the preservation of that life 
must, I think, supersede any other possible use of Mars,” which suggests he may be 
thinking of the value of Martian life in instrumental terms himself. 5 Strictly speaking, I should say non-evolving entities, since it’s the capacity to engage in open ended evolution which sets living things apart from non-living ones in terms of their participation in manifest complexity.  Truly intelligent machines, for example, would likely be SRCT beings morally equal to humans. 
 
                                                        
limited rational capacity?  I argue that they fall under the protective umbrella of their 
species characteristics and thus have all the intrinsic value of their species.  
 There are two basic reasons for this.  First, such an expansive approach accords 
best with our social instincts and emotions, which are not terribly precise.  It would do 
great violence to our psyche to violate these intuitions by treating each individual on his 
own merits at all times.   Much more importantly, however, are considerations which 
explain why we have the intuitions we do.  It seems likely that no social group can 
function long without the capacity to “carry” individuals who are not currently 
productive.  If we instead treat other human beings strictly in terms of what they can 
contribute to the group now, each and every one of us will be in jeopardy on occasion.  
This will weaken our individual justification for being a part of the group – after all, 
when I am fit and healthy, I don’t need the group as much and if the group will let me die 
whenever I am not strong and healthy, then what is the motivation for staying part of the 
group in general? 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 I have argued that ratiocentrism itself is too simple a foundation for a universal 
ethic, because it tends to evolve in concert with both adaptive sociality and culture.  
Indeed, the association of the SRCT may be so strong that it constitutes a universal 
property of other intelligent species in the universe.  If so, those with a pragmatic bent 
may have a means to cut the Gordian knot of endless debate over moral valuation: though 
we can never fully resolve the question of moral “truth,” but we can at least say that all 
entities capable of constructing their own ethical theories will agree that SRCT 
characteristics must be foundational.  It may even be that there is merit to the idea that the 
“goal” of all living things, whether SRCT or not, is to participate in an unfolding of 
complexity, which offers a potential metaphysical basis for morality.  This approach 
results in the delineation of three basic ethical categories into which all living beings can 
be sorted:  1) Those with SRCT, which have full blown intrinsic value,  2) Those with 
only partial SRCT capacity, which have both intrinsic and instrumental value and  3) 
Those without any SRCT capacity, which have only instrumental value. 
 This is, to put it mildly, an ambitious project.  I freely admit that it is nowhere 
near completion:  there are certainly many criticisms to be answered and details to be 
worked out.  But my goal is only to sketch the broad outlines of a possible general theory 
of ethical value for astrobiology in a way that generates fruitful debate.  If others find this 
sufficiently intriguing to take up my challenge, it will have been a successful experiment.  
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